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CEEDING GIVEN OFFENSIVE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL EFFECT IN
SUBSEQUENT CIVIL SUIT UNDER FEDERAL SECURITIES LAwS-

Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 99 S. Ct. 645 (1979).
In November 1974, a stockholders' class action was brought
against Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. (Parklane) and twelve of its officers, directors and stockholders in federal district court.' The action
-alleged that the proxy statement issued by Parklane on September
24, 1974, was "materially false and misleading," and thus violated
several provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2 The
proxy statement concerned a proposed merger plan to convert
Parklane from a publicly owned corporation into a privately operated
company, leaving the individual defendants in complete control. 3 The
merger was affirmatively voted on at a stockholders' meeting on October 14, 1974, and implemented soon thereafter. 4 Parklane thus
merged with New PLHC Corp., a privately held company owned by
5
the defendants and formed solely for the purpose of the merger.
The plaintiff minority shareholders received two dollars per share for
their holdings, subject to any dissenting shareholder's appraisal
rights. 6 The individual defendants, however, received shares of the
newly formed corporation and a right of participation in its future
business. 7 The complaint alleged, inter alia, s that the proxy state-

1 Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815, 816 (2d Cir. 1977), affd, 99 S. Ct. 645
(1979). Parklane was a company engaged in the retail sale of women's apparel. Id.
2 Id. The provisions of the Act alleged to have been violated were § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1976) (manipulative and deceptive devices), § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1976) (inadequate reporting to the SEC), § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976) (solicitation of proxies in
violation of rules and regulations), and § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1976) (joint and several
liability of control persons). Id.
3 SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 558 F.2d
1083 (2d Cir. 1977). The overall plan called for the majority shareholder, Herbert N. Somekh,
and those associated with him, to transfer their stock to New PLHC Corp., a newly formed
corporation. This company would then attempt to obtain the remaining outstanding Parklane
shares, resulting in a merger with Parklane and the elimination of the minority shareholders.
Id.
4 See Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815, 816 (2d Cir. 1977), affd, 99 S.Ct. 645
(1979).
5 SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477, 479-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 558
F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977).
6 Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815, 816-17 (2d Cir. 1977), aff'd, 99 S. Ct. 645
(1979). The purpose of appraisal is to determine the true value of shares. Id. at 817.
7 Brief for Respondent at 3-4, Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 99 S. Ct. 645 (1979).
' See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
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ment fraudulently caused the merger 9 and that the defendants were
liable pursuant to SEC rule 10b-5.10 This provision prohibits distribution of a proxy staternent in connection with a fraudulent
scheme. 1
In May 1976, about a year and a half after the commencement of
the class action but before the decision in that action had been rendered, 12 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought a
suit in district court1 3 against Parklane and its majority shareholder.
The complaint was based on the charge that defendants had issued a
materially false and misleading proxy statement.1 4 Similar to that of
the minority shareholders' class action, the SEC alleged that the
statement obscured "the true underlying purpose of having Parklane
Hosiery Co., Inc. go private."' 15 The SEC sought injunctive 16 and
9 Brief for Respondent, supra note 7, at 3. The minority shareholders' complaint alleged
that the proxy statement was false and misleading because it failed to disclose that: (1) the true
purpose of the merger was to financially benefit Parklane's president to help him satisfy personal obligations ,and not to achieve a valid corporate objective; (2) certain lease negotiations
could result in a substantial economic benefit to Parklane; and (3) the appraisers who determined the fair value of Parklane's stock were not supplied with sufficient information to be
accurate in their evaluation. Id. at 4.
10 Id. at 3. Rule 10b-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. 34.14 (1979).
'I Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815, 817 (2d Cir. 1977), aff'd, 99 S. Ct. 645
(1979). The minority shareholders sought recission of the merger, damages, costs and such other
relief as might be granted by the court. Id.
12 Id.
13 SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 558 F.2d 1083
(2d Cir. 1977).
14 Id. at 479-80. The SEC, in seeking an injunction and other equitable relief, alleged that
the issuance of the September 1974 proxy statement by Parklane was in violation of section 17(a)
of the Securities Act of 1933 and sections 10(b), 13(a) and 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. Id. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976), prohibits the use
of interstate commerce for fraudulent interstate transactions. For a parenthetical description of
the other sections of the securities laws, see note 2 supra.
15 SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 558 F.2d
1083 (2d Cir. 1977).
16 Id. at 479. The SEC sought an injunction to prevent the defendants from further violating
the proxy, antifraud and reporting provisions of the federal securities laws. See notes 2 & 14
supra and accompanying text.
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other equitable relief. 17 The district court found that the omissions
and misstatements of the proxy had violated Section 14 (a)18 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The only relief afforded was an
amendment to the proxy statement since the court found the violation
"was an isolated occurrence." 19 The Second Circuit affirmed the
de20
cision.
Subsequently, the minority shareholders of the class action suit
sought partial summary judgment.2 1 They contended that the defendSEC enforcement actions are governed by criteria which are less stringent than those in
private injunctive actions. SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 808 (2d Cir.
1975). Management Dynamics, cited for support in SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., articulated
that:
Unlike private actions, which are rooted wholly in the equity jurisdiction of the
federal court, SEC suits for injunctions are "creatures of statute." "[P]roof of irreparable injury or the inadequacy of the remedies as in the usual suit for injunction" is not required.
Id. at 808.
The court in Management Dynamics reasoned that when the possibility of future violation
of the securities laws is clearly demonstrated, the SEC is statutorily exempted from showing
irreparable injury. Id. Therefore, in SEC suits, the only critical question asked by the courts is
whether "there is a reasonable likelihood that the wrong will be repeated." SEC v. Manor
Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100 (2d Cir. 1972); accord, Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 394, 405-06 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973);
SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241, 249-50 (2d Cir. 1959).
17 SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 558 F.2d
1083 (2d Cir. 1977). Part of the SEC action was "for ancillary relief to remedy those [violations]
which it claims have already occurred." Id. Specifically, the SEC suggested that a special counsel be appointed to appraise the fair value of the stock held by the minority shareholders who
were eliminated by the merger. The SEC recommended that the counsel be granted the power
to calculate and distribute the difference between the amount paid to the minority shareholders
who did not dissent to the merger (two dollars per share) and the stock's true value. Id. at 486.
'8 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976). This section states in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, . . . in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of
his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security
(other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to section 781 of this title.
Id.
19 SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 558 F.2d
1083 (2d Cir. 1977). Herbert Somekh was the president of and an investor in Parklane, not a
securities dealer or broker, and had never been involved in any impropriety with other
Parklane securities transactions prior to this litigation. Id. Although Somekh's and Parklane's
actions constituted a violation of section 14(a), the court granted only equitable relief. Id. This
decision demonstrates the second circuit's adherence to the analysis by Mr. Justice Douglas on
the role of the equity court in Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944) (equity
judgment, historically flexible, promotes justice through deterence rather than punishment);
accord, SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 56 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. Management
Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d. 801, 807 (2d Cir. 1975).
20 SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977).
21 Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815, 818 (2d Cir. 1977), aff'd, 99 S. Ct. 645
(1979). Petitioners, not yet having offered proof, see id. at 818, moved for partial summary
judgment only on the issue that the proxy statement was materially false and misleading. Id. at
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ants were collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of fact that
the proxy statement was false and misleading, since this issue had
been resolved adverse to the defendants in the SEC action. 22 This
motion was denied by the district court in a terse, "cryptic opinion."

23

The Second Circuit reversed'and remanded, 24 holding that

25
collateral estoppel prevented relitigation of identical issues of fact.
Because this holding created an intercircuit conflict,2 6 the Supreme
27
Court granted certiorari.
In ParklaneHosiery Co. v. Shore2 8 the Supreme Court affirmed
the Second Circuit by an eight to one verdict, with Mr. Justice
Rehnquist as the sole dissenter. 2 9 The majority held that "the
petitioners received a 'full and fair' opportunity to litigate" the issues
in the prior SEC suit; therefore, the "materially false and misleading"
character of the proxy statement could not be relitigated-offensive
collateral estoppel applied. 30 The Court further determined that the
petitioners' seventh amendment right to a jury trial was not violated
by the estoppel arising from the prior, nonjury SEC action. 3 '

817-18. Monetary relief under the federal law requires proof of actual injury and damages. 99
S. Ct. at 648 n.2; see Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 388-90 (1970); Gould v.
American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777-79 (3d Cir. 1976). In addition, suits for monetary claims require scienter. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206-14 (1976).
22 Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815, 818 (2d Cir. 1977), aff'd, 99 S. Ct.
645
(1979).
23 Id.
24 Id. at 824. Besides determining the collateral estoppel issue, the court also concluded
that since the respondents had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the SEC action,
resulting in no issues of fact left for adjudication, the right to a jury trial pursuant to the seventh
amendment was not denied by the estoppel. Id. at 822. For a full discussion of the seventh
amendment issue, see notes 52-72 & 106-13 infra and accompanying text.
25 Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815, 816 (2d Cir. 1977), aff'd, 99 S. Ct. 645
(1979); see notes 32-38 infra and accompanying text.
26 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 99 S. Ct. 645, 648 (1979). The Court of Appeals
for the
Fifth Circuit, confronted with a similar fact pattern, had determined that a prior holding in an
injunction action of violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities Act of 1933
did not preclude relitigation of the same issue in a civil claim. Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59,
63-464 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971). The Rachal court reasoned that since
the corporation did not have a jury trial nor a right to one in the injunction action, it had a right
to a jury trial in the subsequent civil suit. Id. For a further discussion of Rachal, see notes
47-51 & 70 infra and accompanying text.
27 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978).
28 99 S. Ct. 645 (1979).
29 Id. at 655 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist, his dissent based solely on the
petitioners' right to a jury trial, was not "outraged" by the outcome of the case because he
believed the petitioners deserved a finding of violations of the federal securities statutes. Id.
However, he felt the majority overstepped the boundaries of fairness when they denied
petitioners' right to a jury trial. Id.; see note 54 infra and accompanying text.
30 99 S. Ct. at 652. Parklane Hosiery was the first Supreme Court case to entertain the
question of whether the offensive use of collateral estoppel was permissible.
31 Id. at 652.
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The purpose of collateral estoppel, similar to that of res
judicata, 32 is to expedite litigation in the courts33 and to finalize the
resolution of disputes. 34 Thus, collateral estoppel, as issue estoppel,
bars a suit when an identical question of fact essential to that judgment has necessarily been litigated and determined in a prior action
involving one or both of the present parties. 3 5 Traditionally, this
issue estoppel required mutuality and could only be used in a defensive manner. 36 The doctrine of mutuality means that a subsequent
32 Under the doctrine of res judicata, a prior judgment rendered on the merits acts as an
absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same litigants, or those in privity with them,
when based on the same claim or cause of action. 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.405[1],
at 621 (2d ed. 1974); see Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876). The doctrine has
further significance, which the Eighth Circuit has well summarized:
Whenever a court having jurisdiction has rendered a final judgment upon the
merits of a cause of action, that judgment is binding upon the parties and their
privies not only as to every matter that was litigated but also to every matter which
could have been litigated. In event of subsequent litigation upon the same cause of
action, the parties and their privies are precluded from receiving relief.
Towle v. Boeing Airplane Co., 364 F.2d 590, 592 (8th Cir. 1966).
33 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.441[2], at 3779-80 (2d ed. 1974); Tillman v. National City Bank, 118 F.2d 631, 634 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 650 (1941). Collateral
estoppel is "a reasonable measure calculated to save individuals and courts from the waste and
burden of relitigating old issues." Id.; see Vestal, Res Judicata/ClaimPreclusion: Judgment for
the Claimant, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 357 (1967).
34 See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 598 (1948). The Court stated that "[oInce a
party has fought out a matter in litigation with the other party, he cannot later renew that
duel." Id. The finality doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata preserve the integrity of
judicial decisions. Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion by Judgment: The Law Applied in Federal
Courts, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1723, 1723 (1968).
35 RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68(1) (1942); see, e.g., Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333
U.S. 591, 597-98 (1948); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co., 320 U.S. 661, 671 (1944).
To best clarify what is meant by "issue" estoppel, a brief comparison of res judicata and

collateral estoppel is needed. These doctrines have been called "claim preclusion" and "issue
preclusion" respectively. Vestal, supra note 33, at 357-59. In claim preclusion (res judicata), the

first suit has "an effect upon the totality of the second suit," and can result in the preclusion of
the entire subsequent litigation. Id. at 357. In issue preclusion (collateral estoppel), the "issues
of law or fact involved in the second suit" have been affected by the decision in the prior
litigation, and the party will be estopped from relitigating those issues already determined, Id.
at 357 (emphasis in original).
The Supreme Court in Lawlor v. National Screen Serv., 349 U.S. 322 (1955), gave an
excellent analysis of the differences between these two judicial devices in more traditional terminology:
The basic distinction between the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel . . . has frequently been emphasized. Thus, under the doctrine of res judicata, a
judgment "on the merits" in a prior suit involving the same parties or their privies
bars a second suit based on the same cause of action. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, on the other hand, such a judgment precludes relitigation of issues
actually litigated and determined in the prior suit, regardless of whether it was
based on the same cause of action as the second suit.
349 U.S. at 326 (footnotes omitted).
36 See generally Note, The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by a Nonparty, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1010 (1967).

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:681

claim concerning the same issue can have collateral estoppel effect
only if it involves the same parties as the original action. 3 7 Defensive
use of collateral estoppel occurs when a defendant estops a plaintiff
from asserting an issue that the plaintiff has litigated and lost in a
38
prior suit.
In 1942, the California supreme court abolished- the doctrine of
mutuality in the landmark decision of Bernhard v. Bank of America
National Trust and Savings Association.3 a Justice Traynor reasoned
37 See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942). The Restatement contains the general rule
of mutuality:
a person who is not a party or privy to a party to an action in which a valid judgment other than a judgment in rem is rendered
(a) cannot directly or collaterally attack the judgment, and
(b) is not bound by or entitled to clain the benefits of an adjudication
upon any matter decided in the action.
Id.; Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found'n, 402 U.S. 313, 321-22 (1971).
Mutuality, as a controlling doctrine, relates back to Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co.,
225 U.S. 111 (1912). In Bigelow, the preceding pro-mutuality case law of the late nineteenth
century, see, e.g., Stone v. Farmers' Bank, 174 U.S. 409 (1899); Keohuk & W.R. Co. v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 301 (1894), was summarized and unified by the Court. 225 U.S. at 127. For an
example of an early treatise treating the doctrine, see IA. FREEMAN, LAwV OF JUDGMENTS
§ 428, at 929-32 (5th ed. 1925). For further discussion of the doctrine of mutuality, see notes
39-43 infra and accompanying text.
38 99 S. Ct. at 650; see Note, supra note 36 at 1019-32. A modern application of collateral
estoppel involves its offensive use. Offensive use forecloses a defendant from relitigating the
claims that he had previously argued against another plaintiff and lost. Id. The results of applying offensive collateral estoppel differ from those of applying defensive collateral estoppel. The
promotion of judicial economy, for example, is not achieved to the same extent in the application of offensive, as it is in defensive collateral estoppel. The initial premise underlying the
application of either type of estoppel is that the party must have litigated in a prior suit.
Defensive use acts as a penalty to a plaintiff who does not join all defendants in one action
because a decision for the defendant in the first action will estop the plaintiff from relitigating
identical issues. Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 421 n.2 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 865 (1950) (although plaintiff is under no obligation to consolidate suits, fairness does not
require that he be bestowed privilege of re-trying identical issues after failing to do so); Reardon
v. Allen, 88 N.J. Super., 560, 571, 213 A.2d 26, 32 (Law Div. 1965). In Bernhard v. Bank of
America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942), the California supreme court stated that defensive use of collateral estoppel alleviates the problem of allowing
"one who has had his day in court to reopen identical issues by merely switching adversaries."
19 Cal. 2d at 812, 122 P.2d at 895.
Offensive use of collateral estoppel, however, creates the opposite effect. A plaintiff has a
reason to adopt a wait and see attitude because a favorable judgment by another plaintiff in a
prior action will allow the subsequent plaintiff to bind the same defendant in his suit. See
Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App. 2d 762, 767-68, 775, 327 P.2d 111, 115, 119 (1958) (offensive collateral estoppel promotes litigation); Reardon v. Allen, 88 N.J. Super. at 571-72, 213
A.2d at 32. In Reardon, the New Jersey superior court, law division, acknowledged that the
plaintiff who delays in bringing suit is awarded two chances to have an essential issue litigated
on the merits. Id. For a further comparison of defensive and offensive uses of collateral estoppel, see notes 77-105 infra.
39 19 Cal. 2d 807, 807, 122 P.2d 892, 892 (1942). In Bernhard, an administratrix of an estate
filed objections in probate court to an accounting of the estate filed by the previous executor.
Id. at 808, 122 P.2d at 893. The probate court found that the amount of the estate in dispute
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that a party "who has had his day in court" should be prevented from
again drawing an issue into controversy by merely changing opponents. 40 Nearly thirty years later in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,
Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation,4 1 the Supreme Court, over-

was distributed by authorization as a gift during the decedent's lifetime. Id. The administratrix
then brought suit against the bank to recover the money in question on the ground that the
decedent never authorized any withdrawals from her account with the bank. Id. The court held
that the bank was not precluded, by lack of mutuality, from pleading collateral estoppel against
the administratrix, since identical issues had been adjudicated by a court of competent
jurisdiction-the probate court. See id. at 810-11, 122 P.2d at 894-95 (court uses term res
judicata broadly as to encompass collateral estoppel).
The mutuality doctrine has been lambasted on public policy grounds at least as early as
1827 when Jeremy Bentham categorized mutuality as "a maxim which one would suppose to
have found its way from the gaming-table to the bench." 3 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 579 (1827). Nonetheless, according to Professors Moore and Currier,
mutuality had been consistently followed in most state courts, with the same being true on the
federal level, in cases where they were free to apply their own doctrine. Moore & Currier,
Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TuL. L. REv. 301, 304 (1961). Even as recently
as the early 1970s, a significant number of state courts had reaffirmed their adherence to this
doctrine. E.g., Keith v. Schiefen-Stockham Ins. Agency, Inc., 209 Kan. 537, 498 P.2d 265
(1972); Daigneau v. National Cash Register Co., 247 So. 2d 465 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
However, these cases were the last of a dying breed supporting an unpopular belief, the trend
turned "away from the rigid requirements of mutuality" towards a more equitable and flexible
system. 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

0.405, at 53 (2d ed. Supp. 1976).

This movement away from mutuality has long been present but in the guise of "exceptions"
to mutuality. E.g., Portland Gold Mining Co. v. Stratton's Independence, 158 F. 63, 68-69 (8th
Cir. 1907) (the general rule of mutuality is subject to recognized and rational exceptions). For a
general background discussion of the exceptions to mutuality, see Note, supra note 36, at
1015-17. In Bernhard, Justice Traynor rejected classification of the issue before him as an
"exception," and as one commentator wrote, "chose instead to extirpate the mutuality requirement and put it to the torch." Currie, Civil Procedure:The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REV.
25, 26 (1965).
40 19 Cal. 2d at 812, 122 P.2d at 895.
When this previous opportunity to litigate is given, mutuality must then yield to the everpresent public policy of finality. Otherwise, a party who has lost on a question of fact will
"re-open and re-try all the old issues each time he can obtain a new adversary not in privity
with his former one." Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 132-33, 172 A. 260, 263
(1934). The main thrust in abandoning mutuality is broader than merely achieving "efficient
judicial administration." Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of I11.
Found'n, 402 U.S. 313,
.328 (1971). The courts must decide "whether it is any longer tenable to afford a litigant more
than one full and fair opportunity for judicial resolution of the same issue." Id.
Of course, the opportunity to initially litigate the issue cannot be extinguished, either by
res judicata or by offensive or defensive use of collateral estoppel, because of the constitutionally guaranteed privilege of due process. 19 Cal. 2d at 810, 122 P.2d at 894. Justice Traynor
reiterated "that no person [may] be deprived of personal or property rights by a judgment
without notice and an opportunity to be heard." Id.; see Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 329
("[s]ome litigants-those who never appeared in prior action-may not be collaterally estopped
without litigating the issue"); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940) (litigants must be "afforded such notice and opportunity to be heard as are requisite to the due process which the
Constitution prescribes"); Moore & Currier, supra note 39, at 308.
41 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
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ruling the long controlling case of Triplett v. Lowell, 42 adopted the
reasoning of Bernhard and thus abolished the requirement of mutual43
ity on the federal level.
The rationale which led to the abolishment of mutuality, namely
affording a party only one fair and full opportunity to litigate, contributed to the use of offensive collateral estoppel in several state
courts. 44 Offensive collateral estoppel gives a plaintiff, who had not
42 297 U.S. 638 (1936). In Triplett, the Court succinctly stated the majority rule which had
required mutuality:
Neither reason nor authority supports the contention that an adjudication adverse to any or all the claims of a patent precludes another suit upon the same
claims against a different defendant. While the earlier decision may by comity be
given great weight in a later litigation and thus persuade the court to render a like
decree, it is not res adjudicata and may not be pleaded as a defense.
Id. at 642. Contra, see notes 39-44 supra and accompanying text. The Triplett Court, like some
other early courts, used the term res judicata to encompass the doctrine of collateral estoppel. See, e.g., Developments, Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. REv. 818, 820 n.1 (1952). Both these
doctrines required the same parties in the second suit as in the first suit. Even today, res
judicata requires the same parties in the second suit, see note 32 supra and accompanying text,
although the specific word "mutuality" is almost exclusively used with respect to collateral estoppel. For cases adhering to the doctrine of mutuality, see note 37 supra and accompanying
text.
43 402 U.S. at 317-27, 349-50. In Blonder-Tongue, two separate suits involving a patent
were brought by the same plaintiff against different defendants. The Seventh Circuit upheld the
validity of the patent while the Eighth Circuit held that it was invalid. Id. at 314-17. On
appeal, the Supreme Court asked that the question of mutuality be argued, and in its opinion,
rejected the doctrine, thus overruling Triplett. Id. at 317, 349-50.
4" B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 225 N.E.2d 195 (1967) is
one of the first cases in which a state court had both specifically identified and allowed the
"offensive" use of collateral estoppel. The court applied the rationale of allowing only one opportunity to litigate and found that "there seems to be no reason in policy or precedent to
prevent the 'offensive' use of a prior judgment" by a nonparty. Id. at 143, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 598,
225 N.E.2d at 196. In DeWitt, the defendant's jeep collided with a truck owned by the plaintiff
and operated by the plaintiff's employee. Id. The employee sued for personal injuries and
recovered a $5,000 verdict; two months later, the plaintiff sued defendant for property damage
to the truck. Id. The Court of Appeals of New York reinstated the decision of the trial court
which had granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Id.
Though DeWitt was one of the first state courts to so name the use as "offensive," courts in
New York had allowed the affirmative use of collateral estoppel for years before 1967. See, e.g.,
United Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Saeli, 297 N.Y. 611, 75 N.E.2d 626 (1947); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
v. George Colon & Co., 260 N.Y. 305, 183 N.E. 506 (1932). Similarly, other states, such as
Ohio and New Jersey, applied collateral estoppel offensively but did not specifically categorize
the use as "offensive." For example, in Desmond v. Kramer, 96 N.J. Super. 96, 232 A.2d 470
(Law Div. 1967), fourteen passengers of a bus, which had been involved in an accident with
another bus and a truck, successfully sued the defendants (owner and driver of the truck, and
the bus company) in a consolidated action. In a subsequent consolidated suit for contribution
among the defendants and for liability to a plaintiff passenger not a party to the prior actions,
the court found that the prior judgment establishing the bus company's negligence as the concurrent efficient cause of the accident estopped the defendants from relitigating that issue. 96
N.J. Super. at 97-106, 232 A.2d at 471-76. See also Hicks v. De La Cruz, 52 Ohio St. 2d 71,
369 N.E.2d 776 (1977).
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been a party in a prior adjudication, the right to prevent a defendant,
who had been a party, from relitigating an issue adversely determined. 45 At the federal level, the doctrine had been applied offensively by a minority of courts even before the Supreme Court deci46
sion in Parklane Hosiery.
A Fifth Circuit case which denied the application of collateral
estoppel in an offensive use situation, basing its decision on the primacy of the jury trial right, was Rachal v. Hill.47 This case is representative of the standard approach taken by the federal courts
before Parklane Hosiery. In Rachal, a derivative action was filed in
the district court against the chairman of the board, the president and
the secretary-treasurer of a corporation to recover damages sustained
from violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities Act of 1933.48 Prior to the filing of this suit, the SEC brought

45 B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 146-47, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 601-02, 225
N.E.2d 195, 198-99. The Supreme Court in Parklane Hosiery distinguished the technical differences between offensive and defensive use as follows:
In this context, offensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when the plaintiff
seeks to foreclose the defendant from litigating an issue the defendant has previously litigated unsuccessfully in an action with another party. Defensive use occurs
when a defendant seeks to prevent a plaintiff from asserting a claim the plaintiff has
previously litigated and lost against another defendant.
99 S. Ct. at 649 n.4. For a more detailed discussion of offensive collateral estoppel, see note 38
supra and notes 46-51 infra and accompanying text.
46 E.g., Zdanok v. Glidden, 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964). Zdanok involved two suits (the
other was Alexander v. Glidden Co.) by two groups of employees against the same employer.
The Alexander action was filed first, but the Zdanok action, filed two years later, was litigated
first. 327 F.2d at 946-49. The plaintiffs in Zdanok lost at the trial level but, on appeal, won a
judgment on the merits. Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961). The Alexander
case, in modified form, then came before the same federal district court, and the defendant
corporation tried to reopen Zdanok on the merits in light of additional information and evidence. 327 F.2d at 946-47. After weighing the principles behind the "law of the case" doctrine
and the finality considerations of collateral estoppel, id. at 952-53, the court, in what was effectively an offensive application of collateral estoppel, found for the plaintiff employees. Id. at
954-55.
Procedurally, Zdanok is similar to Parklane Hosiery. Glidden, defendant corporation, had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the Zdanok case, and the defendant's argument that it would
have defended more diligently if both the Zdanok and Alexander actions were combined was
rejected by the court. Id. at 955-57. Glidden could not argue that it was unfairly surprised by
the estoppel effect of the Zdanok judgment because Alexander's action in the state court, which
awaited the Zdanok decision, was known to Glidden. Alexander's action was filed first and heard
last, and Glidden fought the case up through the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 946-49.
See also Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 490 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash. 1962), aff'd as to res judicata sub. nora.,
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964);
McHone v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 406 F. Supp. 484 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
47 435 F.2d 59, 63--64 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971).
48

Id. at 60.
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an injunctive action in which it was found that the defendants violated the securities laws. 4 9 When the stockholder derivative suit
reached the court of appeals, that court held that an injunctive proceeding 50 would not preclude relitigation of an issue in a civil
action--otherwise, defendants would be denied the right to a jury
trial. 51
The seventh amendment, 52 which granted the right to a jury
trial, was designed to preserve and protect the right as it existed in
1791. 53 A trial by jury has been considered by some since the beginning of our nation to be the last stronghold against overzealous
courts. Thomas Jefferson stated that "trial by jury [is] the only anchor
yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the
principles of its constitution." 5 4 Through the years, however, the
constitutionality of certain procedural devices has lessened the mys55
tique of the hallowed right to a jury trial.
In Galloway v. United States, 56 the Supreme Court determined
that the judicial system of today should not be bound by procedural
rules and peculiarities utilized by the courts in 1791. 5 7 The Court
49 Id. at 60-61.
50 Id.

at 63-64.

51 id. The court in Rachal was influenced by the reasoning of Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959) (to deprive party of jury trial by adjudicating equitable claim first
is abuse of court's discretion except under most extraordinary circumstances), and Dairy Queen,
Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962) (though equitable and legal issues may be joined in one suit,
the seventh amendment's guarantee of jury trial is not lost).
52 The seventh amendment states:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to
the rules of the common law.
U.S. Const. amend. VII. For an in depth analysis and discussion of the history of the seventh
amendment, see Wolfram, The ConstitutionalHistory of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L.
REV. 639 (1973).
53 Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935); Dimick v. Schiedt,
293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935).
5 3 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 71 (Washington ed. 1861). Justice Rehnquist in his

dissenting opinion in Parklane Hosiery agreed with the reasoning of Jefferson:
The founders of our Nation considered the right of trial by jury in civil cases an
important bulwark against tyranny and corruption, a safeguard too precious to be
left to the whim of the sovereign, or, it might be added, to that of the judiciary.
99 S. Ct. at 657 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Wolfram, supra note 52, at 653-73.
5 Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388-93 (1943) (directed verdict); Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 497-98 (1931) (order for retrial limited to
question of damages); Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Md. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 319-21
(1902) (summary judgment); Peterson v. Albano, 158 N.J. Super. 503, 506-07, 386 A.2d 873,
875 (App. Div. 1978) (summary dispossess action).
56 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
5' Id. at 390-92. Compare Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943) with Dimick v.
Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935), in which the Court made an important distinction between the
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reasoned that the conclusion which both history and prior case law
would support was "that the Amendment was designed to preserve
the basic institution of jury trial in only its most fundamental elements, not the great mass of procedural forms and details, varying
even then so widely among common-law jurisdictions." 58 Consequently, it held that a directed verdict, entered prior to a jury de59
termination, did not violate the constitutional right of trial by jury.
In 1959, sixteen years after Galloway, the vitality of the jury trial
right was asserted by the Supreme Court in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 60 where the Court was faced with legal and equitable
claims present in the same action. 6 1 The defendant in Beacon
Theatres sought an equitable declaratory judgment in anticipation of
an antitrust treble damage suit by the plaintiff.6 2 The plaintiff then
filed a counterclaim alleging the antitrust violations and demanded a
jury trial. 63 The district court determined the nonjury equitable action first, which included issues common to both proceedings, before
hearing the counterclaim suit. 64 Although the court of appeals held
that the lower court acted within the scope of its discretion, 6 5 the
Supreme Court reversed. 6 6 The Court recognized that the earlier
decision based on equitable grounds might have a collateral estoppel
effect in the petitioner's treble damage action, resulting in a denial of
the jury trial right. 6 7 The Court held, however, that the constituconstantly changing common law generally, and the seventh amendment which was based on a
specific common law: The common law is
not immutable, but flexible, and upon its own principles adapts itself to varying
conditions ....
But here, we are dealing with a constitutional provision-which has
in effect adopted the rules of the common law, in respect of trial by jury, as these
rules existed in 1791. To effectuate any change in these rules is not to deal with the
common law, qua common law, but to alter the Constitution. The distinction is
fundamental ....
293 U.S. at 487; Walker v. New Mexico and S. Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897) (substance
of right to jury trial should be preserved, not incidental practices of common law in 1791).
58 319 U.S. at 392.
59 Id.
60 359 U.S. 500 (1959)
61 Id. at 510-11.

Id. at 501-04.
Id. at 503.
Id. at 503-04. The district court acted within the discretion purportedly authorized by
rules 42 and 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. Rule 42 allows the court to order a
separate trial "in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice." FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b). Rule
57 allows the court to "order a speedy hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment and may
advance it on the calendar." Id. 57.
65 Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 252 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1958).
62
63

66

359 U.S. at 511.

Id. at 504. For a discussion of collateral estoppel, see notes 32-51 supra and accompanying text.
67
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tional right to a jury trial severely limits the courts' discretion to determine claims in equity first. 68 It further stated "that only under
the most imperative circumstances . . . can the right to a jury trial of
legal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable
69
claims."
Beacon Theatres, capable of differing interpretations, was construed by the Fifth Circuit in Rachal to hold that the right to a jury
determination of a legal issue is preserved even where a parallel
equitable action is heard first. 70 The Second Circuit in Shore v.
Parklane Hosiery Co., 7 1 however, construed Beacon Theatres as implicitly confirming the principle that an earlier determination of issues
in an equitable action "will collaterally estop" adjudication of the
same issues in a subsequent jury trial. 7 2
The primary question emphasized by the Supreme Court in
Parklane Hosiery, however, did not involve the right to a jury trial. 73
68 Id.

at 510-11.
69 Id. The Court stressed the importance of litigating the legal issue first when both legal
and equitable issues are joined in one action because of the possible denial to a party of his
right to a jury trial. Id.; cf. Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Edelstein, 494 F.2d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 1974)
(to proceed with non-jury trial in one case would threaten destruction of defendant's right to
jury trial in related case).
70 435 F.2d at 64. Rachal received widespread acceptance in both federal and state courts.
E.g., Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 504 F.2d 104, 111 n.7 (7th Cir. 1974); Cannon
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 323 F. Supp. 990, 993-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Delta Airlines, Inc. v.
Woods, 137 Ga. App. 693, 697, 224 S.E.2d 763, 766 (1976). In SEC v. Standard Life Corp.,
413 F. Supp. 84 (W.D. Okla. 1976), for example, the district court stated that it was "of the
opinion that the holding in Rachal v. Hill . . . is sound and would apply in the instant case." Id.
at 87.
71 565 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1977), aff'd, 99 S. Ct. 645 (1979).
72 Id. at 820-21. The Second Circuit indicated that the common law of 1791 had no relevance in the present case because of the lack of any 1791 proceeding which would be analogous
to either an SEC hearing or a minority shareholder derivative suit. Id. at 823. While Parklane
Hosiery was the first case to flatly reject Rachal, an earlier Second Circuit case had questioned
it. Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 490 F.2d 332, 343 n.15 (2d Cir. 1973) ("we are not at
all sure that Rachal was correctly decided").
Similar to Parklane Hosiery, the Tenth Circuit had also intrepreted Beacon Theatres to
mean that collateral estoppel might operate to bar relitigation when the equitable claim is heard
first. Meeker v. Ambassor Oil Corp., 308 F.2d 875 (10th Cir. 1962). However, the Supreme
Court reversed the Tenth Circuit with a one-line opinion citing Beacon Theatres. Meeker v.
Ambassor Oil Corp., 375 U.S. 160 (1963). Thus, the Supreme Court seemed to adopt an interpretation of Beacon Theatres similar to that later adopted by Rachal. See notes 47-51 supra
and accompanying text. The Supreme Court in Katchen v. Landry, 382 U.S. 323 (1966), apparently reversed the position it had taken in Meeker. It recognized that there might be instances
when a court should resolve the equitable claims first regardless of the possible loss of the
party's opportunity to argue the legal claims. 382 U.S. at 339. Katchen was viewed by the
Supreme Court in Parklane Hosiery as confirming "that an equitable determination can have
collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent legal action, and that this estoppel does not violate the
Seventh Amendment." 99 S. Ct. at 653.
73 99 S. Ct. at 648-49.
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The major issue was whether collateral estoppel should be allowed
after the petitioners had a full and fair opportunity to litigate their
claims during a prior SEC action. 74 Spe6ifically, it had to be determined whether the prior judgment could be used by a litigant not a
party to the earlier proceeding to offensively estop the petitioner on
75
issues previously resolved.

In discussing offensive collateral estoppel, the Court observed
that in both offensive and defensive use, the party against whom estoppel is asserted has litigated and lost in an earlier action. 7 6 Aside
from this general similarity, the Court recognized several differences
in application of the two doctrines. 77 First, defensive use of collateral estoppel promotes judicial economy while offensive use does
not. 78 When applied defensively, a plaintiff is precluded from relitigating identical claims by simply "switching adversaries" because
he is bound by the suit previously litigated. 79 The Court observed
that this creates a powerful incentive for plaintiffs to combine all potential defendants in the initial action, whenever feasible, because
80
that action will be his only legitimate chance to argue a given issue.
The offensive use of collateral estoppel produces the opposite result.8 1 Since a plaintiff is not bound by a decision in which he is not
a party, the incentive is to delay filing suit in the hope that an action
by a different plaintiff will be decided against the defendant. 8 2 If the
different plaintiff were successful, collateral estoppel could be applied
83
offensively and the plaintiff would profit from his procrastination.
Thus, the Court pointed out that offensive collateral estoppel fosters
an increase in litigation rather than a decrease because a plaintiff has

74 Id.
75 Id. at 649. For a discussion of offensive use of collateral estoppel, see notes 44-51 supra
and accompanying text.
76 99 S. Ct. at 649.
77 Id. at 650-51. See generally Note, supra note 36. For a general discussion of the differences, see note 38 supra and accompanying text.
78 99 S. Ct. at 650.
79 Id.; see Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 813,

122 P.2d 892, 895 (1942).
80 99 S. Ct. at 650-51.
81 Id. at 651.
82

Id.; see, e.g., Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App. 2d 762, 767-68, 327 P.2d 111, 115

(1958); Reardon v. Allen, 88 N.J. Super. 560, 571-72, 213 A.2d 26, 32 (Law Div. 1965). In

Reardon, the court felt it was unfair for the plaintiff to delay bringing suit "in the hope that the
first action by another claimant [would provide] a favorable result." Id. at 571, 213 A.2d at 32.
For a discussion of the extent to which collateral estoppel may be constitutionally applied, see
note 40 supra.
83 99 S. Ct. at 651.
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"everything to gain and nothing to lose by not intervening in the first
action. "' 8 4 This drawback to offensive collateral estoppel was not
found to preclude the doctrine's application in Parklane Hosiery,
since Shore could not possibly have joined in the prior SEC action
without SEC approval.8 5
A second difference clarified by the Supreme Court was that offensive use of collateral estoppel might be unfair to the defendant in
several circumstances. 86 One situation is when a future suit is not
foreseeable. The defendant in the original action might see little
reason to expend a large quantity of money to defend that suit, especially if the damages sought are nominal.8 7 However, in an unforeseen future suit, the damages sought against him could be enormous. 88 This problem, similar to that of increased litigation, was not
present in the facts of Parklane Hosiery.89 The Court held that the
appellants "had every incentive to litigate the SEC lawsuit fully and
vigorously," 90 noting that the minority shareholder suit was pending
the outcome of the SEC action. 9 1 Due to the serious SEC allegation
of a false and misleading proxy statement and the natural desire to
92
avoid future liability, a spirited defense was likely to follow.
The Court pointed out that further unfairness could result to the
defendant if the previous judgment, relied upon by the new plaintiff
as the basis for estoppel, was inconsistent with prior judgments favoring the defendant. 93 The well-known hypothetical in which a collision injures fifty passengers, each of whom files a personal injury action against a railroad, 94 was mentioned as an example. 9 5 In the
84

Id.

at 652. 15 U.S.C. § 78 u(g) prohibits consolidation of an SEC action with a private
action without the consent of the SEC. Id.; cf. SEC v. Everest Management Corp., 475 F.2d
1236, 1240 (2d Cir. 1972) (SEC workload would be increased by intervention of private litigants
with resultant complication of litigation).
85 Id.

86 99 S. Ct. at 651.
87 Id.
88 See id.; Berner v. British Commonwealth-Pac. Airlines Ltd., 346 F.2d 532, 538-41 (2d
Cir. 1965). In Berner, a prior action resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff of $35,000 and the
defendant did not appeal. A subsequent suit for over seven million dollars was filed by a different plaintiff who moved for offensive application of collateral estoppel. The court denied plaintiff's motion because of the gross unfairness which would result to the defendant. Id.
s9 99 S. Ct. at 652; see notes 90-93 infra and accompanying text.

90 99 S. Ct. at 652.
91 Id.

92 See id. Subsequent suits filed by shareholders typically follow an SEC action decided in

favor
93
94
REV.
95

of the commission. Id.
Id. at 651.
Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L.
281, 304-10 (1957).
99 S. Ct. at 651 n.14.
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hypothetical, the defendant wins the first twenty-five suits but loses
the twenty-sixth. 96 The Court noted Professor Currie's argument
that collateral estoppel should not be applied offensively to allow the
next twenty-four plaintiffs automatic recovery. 9 7 In Parklane
Hosiery, since the judgment in the SEC action was not inconsistent
or conflicting with any prior decision, the Court could not find this
98
unfairness.
Still another situation, noted by the Court, where offensive collateral estoppel could work unfairness against a defendant is when a
second action would allow the defendant to apply procedural devices,
unavailable in the original action, which could readily lead to a different result. 99 An example would be a situation where a defendant,
unable to choose the forum in the first action, is forced to argue in an
inconvenient setting. This could prevent the defendant from engaging
in extensive discovery and could restrict the calling of witnesses. 10 0
The Court in Parklane Hosiery found that the procedures available to
the defendant in the SEC suit were adequate. 10 1
Despite the negative factors that an application of offensive collateral estoppel sometimes presents, the Court applied the doctrine.
To summarize, the petitioners were estopped from relitigating the
issue of whether there was a false and misleading proxy statement
because the minority shareholders could not have joined in the earlier SEC action. The petitioners had a full and fair opportunity to
argue their claim in the SEC suit and the application of the estoppel
02
was not viewed as unfair.'

96 Id. After winning the first suit, the defendant cannot estop subsequent plaintiffs because
these litigants have never had their day in court. Collateral estoppel, whether offensive or defensive, can only apply against a party who has had a fair and full opportunity to litigate. See notes
74-75 supra and accompanying text.
. 97 99 S. Ct. at 651 n. 14. Professor Currie elaborated that it
would be unfair for the defendant to "be bound by the aberrational twenty-sixth judgment while being unable to rely on the
[previous] twenty-five." Currie, supra note 94, at 304-10. Even in the absence of the extraordinary circumstances of his hypothetical, Professor Currie was against the principle of offensive
collateral estoppel. He stated that the defendant "did not enjoy the initiative in the prior action
or actions, and hence by hypothesis enjoyed something less than a realistic opportunity to present its defense fully and effectively." Id. at 310.
98 99 S. Ct. at 652.
90 Id. at 651.
100 Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88(2), (Comment) at 92-93 (Tent. Draft
No. 2, 1975).
101 99 S. Ct. at 652. The Court rejected any contentions that the right to a jury trial is the
type of procedural opportunity falling under this exception. It felt that "the presence or absence
of a jury as factfinder is basically neutral, quite unlike, for example, the necessity of defending
the first lawsuit in an inconvenient forum." Id. n.19.
102 Id. at 651-52; see notes 77-101 supra and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court thus reasoned that the preferable approach
in dealing with offensive collateral estoppel, rather than precluding
the doctrine, was to grant trial courts "broad discretion" in determining when to apply it.' 0 3 Trial courts must determine whether the
plaintiff could have easily joined in the prior action 104 and whether
the offensive application of collateral estoppel would be unfair to the
defendant. 105
After discussing the doctrinal implications of an offensive application of collateral estoppel, the Court briefly addressed the question
"whether, notwithstanding the law of collateral estoppel, the use of
offensive collateral estoppel in this case would violate the petitioners'
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial." 106 Although the Court
recognized that the purpose of the seventh amendment was to maintain the essence of the jury trial right of 1791,107 a rigid interpreta08
tion was not adopted in light of modern procedural developments.
The Court utilized the rationale of Galloway and held that developments in procedural doctrines, such as collateral estoppel, "are not
repugnant to the seventh amendment simply for the reason that they
did not exist in 1791." 109
The Court focused on dicta from Beacon Theatres that seemed to
admit that, if an equitable claim was heard prior to a legal claim, the
result, due to collateral estoppel, could be the denial of a trial by
jury.' 10 Justice Stewart then adopted the Supreme Court's reasoning
in Katchen v. Landry 1" and concluded that nothing in the seventh
112
amendment foreclosed such a result.
103 99 S. Ct. at 651. A total ban on offensive collateral estoppel would have been inappro-

priate because the current trend is away from the offensive/defensive distinction. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88, Reporter's Note at 99 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975).
The emphasis of the courts is centered on whether an individual has ever had a fair and full
opportunity to litigate an issue. For a discussion of the development of this rationale which led
first to the abolishment of mutuality and then to the use of offensive collateral estoppel, see
notes 39-46 supra and accompanying text.
104 See notes 77-85 supra and accompanying text.
105 99 S. Ct. at 651-52.
10I Id. at 652. See generally notes 47-72 supra and accompanying text.
107 99 S. Ct. at 652.
108 Id. at 654. For a discussion of procedural devices developed since 1791, see notes 55-57
supra and accompanying text.
109 99 S. Ct. at 654.
110 Id. at 653. For a discussion of Beacon Theatres, see notes 60-69 supra and accompanying
text.
1 382 U.S. 323 (1966). In Katchen, the Court acknowledged that there might be situations
where it would be appropriate to determine equitable claims first. Id. at 339.
112 99 S. Ct. at 653-55. In addition, the Court cut back on the strong language in Beacon
Theatres favoring a jury trial where legal and equitable claims are present in the same action
and the district court has a choice as to which claims to hear first. See id.; notes 62 & 65 supra
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Although the decision in Parklane Hosiery represents a step forward for the proponents of collateral estoppel, it presents a disturbing
corollary-the amount of power indirectly granted to the SEC and
other agencies. For example, in private civil suits dealing with violations of the securities laws, the SEC will often simultaneously initiate
an injunctive action against the defendant. Since a decision in an SEC
equity action will collaterally estop a defendant from relitigating an
issue, such as the existence of a false and misleading proxy statement,
the SEC can now wield a powerful sword in the enforcement of the
securities laws. 11 3 Prior to the circuit court opinion in Parklane
Hosiery, 1 4 an injunctive action brought by the SEC generally had no
definite effect, either directly or indirectly, on civil suits for damages.1 15 In the future, however, it will be imprudent for a defendant
to challenge an SEC directive due to the collateral estoppel effect of
a subsequent SEC suit in district court.
In SEC actions, the likely consequence will be an increase in
consent agreements between the SEC and defendants since consent
agreements have no collateral estoppel effect. 1 16 Thus, in cases
where the SEC has commenced suit, the practical result of the adoption of offensive collateral estoppel will be to frustrate the doctrine's
purpose of preventing multiple litigation. In addition, consent agreements themselves are not desirable because defendants will be forced
to adhere to a one-sided view of the securities laws. These laws can
only be well served if the SEC can be fearlessly challenged when it
oversteps its bounds.
The only limitation 'on the use of collateral estoppel following an
SEC action will be technical deficiencies such as lack of identity of
issues in the SEC suit and a subsequent civil action. 1 17 For example, since the issue in a rule 10b-5 injunctive proceeding may merely
be whether the party acted negligently and the issue in the civil action is whether the party acted intentionally, l l8 collateral estoppel
and accompanying text. Justice Stewart stated that Beacon Theatres "enunciated no more than a
general prudential rule." 99 S. Ct. at 653.
"3 See Note, CollateralEstoppel and the Right to a Jury Trial, 57 NEB. L. REV. 863, 875-76
(1978). See generally Comment, The Effect of SEC Injunctions in Subsequent Private Damage
Actions-Rachal v. Hill, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1329, 1340-43 (1971).
114 565 F.2d at 823-24; see note 72 supra and accompanying text.
"' See Note, Right to Jury Trial and Collateral Estoppel in Securities Litigation, 42 ALB. L.
REV. 733, 741 (1978); notes 46 & 70 supra and accompanying text.
116 E.g., RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment e at 9 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977); see
Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 327 (1955).
1'7See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
158 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12, 206-14 (1976). The Court in
Hochfelder expressly held that in rule lob-5 civil actions, intent must be proved. However, the
Court made no determination as to the requirement in injunctive proceedings. 425 U.S. at 194
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would not apply as to state of mind. 1 19 Only the fact of whether a
statement was false and misleading would be estopped from being
relitigated.12 0 Thus, whether the falsity arose through negligence or
intent would still be an open question in the subsequent civil suit.
In allowing offensive collateral estoppel in the federal system,
Parklane Hosiery solidified the concept that a litigant have only one
fair and full opportunity in the courts. However, Congress should
consider passing legislation whereby administrative proceedings
would not have collateral estoppel effect but would merely be treated
as rebuttable evidence of a violation. 121 With such an approach, not
only would the resources and expertise of the SEC, in the form of its
findings, be utilized in the subsequent suit, but also the defendant's
right to a jury trial would remain substantially intact.
Significantly, the SEC and other agencies can partially avoid
both the overreaching problem created by the Parklane Hosiery decision, and the conflict between the offensive application of collateral
estoppel and the seventh amendment right to a jury trial. When requested by a defendant, an administrative agency could consent to a
pursuant to rule 39 (c) of the Fedjury trial in the injunctive action
122
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.
Thomas J. Borkowski
n.12. A number of federal courts have interpreted the application of the rule in injunctive
situations as only requiring a showing of negligence by the defendant. See, e.g., SEC v. World
Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976). In such jurisdictions, the SEC would have to
prove scienter in the injunctive action if it intended for that decision to be the basis for a
possible future application of collateral estoppel as to state of mind. See SEC v. Commonwealth
Chemical Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 96 n.4 (2d Cir. 1978). However, litigation of intent in an
injunctive proceeding, being merely hypothetical, would be improper.
119 See, e.g., Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 323 F. Supp. 990, 994-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(summary judgment denied because issues of fact, including scienter, remained to be determined).
120

Id.

This treatment would be similar to that afforded in the current antitrust laws such as
section 5(a) of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1976). For an excellent discussion of the use
of certain prior judgments as prima facie evidence in subsequent antitrust actions brought
under section 5 of the Clayton Act, see Shores, Treble Damage Antitrust Suits; Admissibility of
PriorJudgments Under Section 5 of the Clayton Act, 54 IoWA L. REV. 434 (1968). Cf. Currie,
supra note 94, at 320-21 (treatment of prior judgment as evidence, not collateral estoppel).
122 Rule 39(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states:
In all actions not triable of right by a jury the court upon motion or of its own
initiative may try any issue with an advisory jury or . . . with the consent of both
parties, may order a trial with a jury whose verdict has the same effect as if trial by
jury had been a matter of right.
Fed R. Civ. P. 39(c).
Consequently, a corporation cannot have a jury trial in an injunctive action by the SEC if
the SEC does not consent to it. 99 S. Ct. at 655 n.24; SEC v. Commonwealth Chemical Sec.,
Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 96-97 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v. Everest Management Corp., 475 F.2d 1236,
1240 n.5 (2d Cir. 1972).
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